Does the Constitution Empower the Council of Ministers to Extend the Implementation Deadline?

Brief Overview

The debate surrounding the Council of Ministers’ resolution on constitutional implementation and the extension of the prescribed implementation period goes beyond simply determining whether the resolution is lawful or unlawful. Rather, the issue must be considered within the broader context of the country’s prevailing circumstances, particularly the rule of law, the capacity of state institutions to fulfil their mandates, the delivery of public services, national security, and economic development. Consequently, evaluating the constitutional authority of the Council of Ministers requires a broader assessment that extends beyond legal interpretation alone.

International financial and development organizations, including the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), assess state fragility and institutional weakness through several key dimensions. These include adherence to the rule of law, the strength and effectiveness of public institutions, security and political stability, and the economic foundations necessary for sustainable development.

According to the 2024 Fragile States Index, Somalia ranked first globally in terms of state fragility, underscoring the challenges associated with institutional stability and governance. This broader context highlights the importance of examining the constitutional and institutional issues surrounding the Council of Ministers’ resolution. Against this background, the discussion now turns to the central issue of this article through three fundamental question

1. Does the Council of Ministers Have the Constitutional Power to Extend or Amend the Constitutionally Prescribed Six-Month Implementation Period?

On 7 October 2026, the Independent Constitutional Review and Implementation Commission (GMDHD), entrusted with overseeing the implementation of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Somalia, issued a press statement addressing the implementation of Articles 81(f) and 117(3) of the Constitution. The statement clarified that the six-month period prescribed for bringing administrative arrangements into conformity with the approved Constitution would expire on 14 October 2026, having commenced on 14 April 2026, when the Constitution entered into force.

The Commission further explained that, effective 14 October 2026, Article 81(1)(f) and Article 117(3)(a) would establish a separation between parliamentary membership and ministerial office. Accordingly, a minister who simultaneously holds a parliamentary seat would cease to serve as a member of the Council of Ministers, while a member of parliament would forfeit their parliamentary seat upon accepting another state office.

On 13 October 2026, the Council of Ministers of the Federal Government of Somalia convened an extraordinary session in response to the statement released by the Independent Constitutional Review and Implementation Commission (GMDHD). Following the meeting, the Council adopted the Resolution on the Implementation of the Constitution and established a committee comprising six ministries, under the chairmanship of the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs. The resolution contains three principal measures: –

1. Requiring the Council of Ministers’ committee to accelerate the implementation of the Constitution.
2. Extending by two months the six-month period allocated by the Constitution for aligning administrative measures.
3. Preparing reports to be shared with the general public, as provided for in Article 5 of the resolution.

The Council of Ministers’ committee would undertake functions similar to those of the Committee for Monitoring Constitutional Review and Implementation under Article 192 and the Independent Constitutional Review and Implementation Commission under Article 193. Those bodies are entrusted with oversight, coordination, and implementation of the Constitution, as well as the preparation of public reports.

The Federal Parliament of Somalia serves as the country’s principal legislative authority, vested with the power to enact, amend, repeal, or revoke laws, either in whole or in part, and to amend the Constitution in accordance with the procedures and requirements it prescribes.

Consequently, any attempt to modify the periods established under Articles 81(1)(f) and 117(3)(a), including an extension of the prescribed deadline, must comply with the constitutional amendment procedures. Such authority cannot be exercised unilaterally by the Council of Ministers through an administrative resolution or press statement.

Furthermore, where the Council of Ministers’ resolution encroaches upon the constitutional mandates of the Independent Constitutional Review and Implementation Commission, the parliamentary committee responsible for constitutional affairs, or either House of the Federal Parliaments, its legal validity must be questioned. In the absence of a proper constitutional or statutory basis, the resolution should be revoked.

The Council of Ministers cannot establish a new procedure to extend the six-month period specified by the Constitution. The action may therefore be characterized as ultra vires, meaning beyond the limits of lawful authority, because the executive branch has exceeded the boundaries of the constitutional powers entrusted to it.

This point is further reinforced by Article 190 of the Constitution, which addresses the Constitution’s entry into force and the six-month period allocated for aligning the administrative measures necessary for its implementation.

2. The Council of Ministers’ Resolution and the Supremacy of the Constitution

First, the new 2026 Constitution does not specifically define the legal meaning of resolutions of the Council of Ministers, nor does any provision expressly grant a general power to use a resolution to suspend or postpone obligations established by the Constitution. However, this does not mean that the Council of Ministers lacks the authority to issue administrative resolutions necessary to discharge its constitutional responsibilities.

Article 5 of the Government Structure Law No. 14 of 3 June 1962 defines the Council of Ministers’  authority to approve regulations and resolutions requiring its approval, within the limits permitted or established by the Constitution or by law.

Can the Council of Ministers, then, use a resolution to suspend or postpone the implementation of an obligation expressly set out in the Constitution? The answer to this question rests on the principles of constitutional supremacy and the separation of state powers.

Under Article 4 of the Constitution recognizes the Constitution as the supreme law of the country (Grundnorm), subject to Islamic Sharia, and requires all state institutions to comply with it.

Furthermore, Article 4(3) expressly states that any law, decision, or administrative measure that conflicts with the Constitution is null and void. This provision directly applies to the legal assessment of the resolution issued by the Council of Ministers.

The principle is encapsulated in the Latin maxim lex superior derogat legi inferiori, which establishes that a legal rule of higher authority takes precedence over one of lower rank. Accordingly, any resolution adopted by the Council of Ministers that contradicts the Constitution cannot override its provisions, since the Constitution remains the supreme law of the country.

Nevertheless, the Council of Ministers may initiate or propose amendments to the Constitution, provided that the prescribed constitutional procedures are observed. However, the authority to propose a constitutional amendment must be distinguished from the power to enact or effect such an amendment. In this regard, Article 189 is relevant.

3. Established State Practice in Forming Somalia’s Council of Ministers under the Five Most Recent Presidents and Ten Prime Ministers Since 2004

Constitutional order differs in how they regulate the composition of the executive, particularly in determining the number of ministries and the allocation of their responsibilities. Somalia has also experienced different approaches to this issue throughout its constitutional history. In general, three principal models can be identified.

                  First Model: The Constitution Determines the Number of Ministers

Under the first model, the Constitution directly specifies the number of ministers or establishes a maximum number that may not be exceeded. Changing that limit requires a constitutional amendment, following the procedure prescribed by the Constitution and generally involving Parliament.

Since Somalia got its statehood in 1960, none of its constitutions has directly specified the number and functions of ministries or the structure of the Council of Ministers, with the exception of the Charters of 2000 as per Article 25 of the Charter, which provides that the Council of Ministers consists of the Prime Minister and no more than twenty-five (25) ministers.

Second Model: Parliament Determines the Number and Responsibilities of Ministries through Ordinary Legislation

Under the second model, the authority to determine the number of ministries and define their respective responsibilities is assigned to Parliament through ordinary legislation. This approach is reflected in Article 116 of Somalia’s new Constitution, which requires Parliament to enact a law regulating the size of the Government and the responsibilities of its members.

This provision raises an important constitutional question: on what legal grounds can the Government justify postponing the implementation of Article 81(1)(f) and Article 117(3)(a) when existing laws remain in force and are not inconsistent with the Constitution? These include the Government Structure Law No. 14 of 3 June 1962 and the prime minister’s Regulation No. 174 of 2025.

Article 191(1) of the Constitution stipulates that laws in force before its adoption shall continue to apply until they are reviewed, as soon as possible, to ensure their conformity with the Constitution. It is therefore necessary to examine whether the existing legal framework, including executive regulations, can continue to govern the relevant matters while new legislation consistent with the Constitution is being prepared and enacted.

This principle is captured by the legal doctrine of continuatio legis, which recognizes the continued validity of existing laws until they are duly reviewed or lawfully replaced.

Third Model: Executive Discretion in Determining the Number and Responsibilities of Ministries

Under the third model, the executive branch, particularly the head of government, is vested with discretion to determine the number of ministries and allocate their respective portfolios, subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution and applicable legislation.

In Somalia, the formation of successive Councils of Ministers from the administration of President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed in 2004 to the present Government has largely followed this model. Over the past twenty-two years, this practice has developed into an established political convention governing the composition and organization of the executive.

This practice is consistent with Somalia’s parliamentary system, under which the Prime Minister generally proposes the composition of the Council of Ministers, including the number of ministries, the allocation of ministerial responsibilities, and the appointment of ministers, while Parliament exercises its constitutionally prescribed powers in the approval process. The formation of the current Council of Ministers by a decree of the Prime Minister illustrates the continued application of this practice.

Nevertheless, executive discretion in forming the Government must be exercised within the constitutional framework and does not displace Parliament’s constitutionally assigned functions. Article 92 of the Constitution provides for the House of the People of the Federal Parliament to grant a vote of confidence to the Prime Minister, while Article 118(2) establishes the requirement for a vote of confidence in the Council of Ministers.

The three models discussed above illustrate the different constitutional mechanisms through which states determine the size and responsibilities of their ministries. Somalia’s constitutional and political experience reflects elements of all three approaches at different stages of its development, as evidenced by its successive constitutions, Article 25 of the 2000 Arta Charter, and the political convention that has governed the formation of successive Councils of Ministers since 2004. These practices must, however, be distinguished from the formal allocation of constitutional powers and assessed in accordance with the applicable constitutional and legislative framework.

Finally, the Council of Ministers does not have the authority to extend, through an administrative resolution, a period specified by the Constitution or to postpone the implementation of a constitutional obligation. Article 4 affirms the supremacy of the Constitution, while Article 191(1) permits earlier laws to remain in force pending their review, provided that they are consistent with the Constitution. Accordingly, any solution involving an extension of the period or an amendment to obligations established by the Constitution must follow the applicable constitutional procedure.