The concept of dual mandate refers to a situation in which an individual simultaneously holds or exercises two or more public offices, whether elective or appointive. The concept is not confined to a particular level of government; the offices may be held at the national/state level, county or regional level, and/or municipal or local level.[1]
It is therefore important not to assume that all legal systems prohibit dual office-holding in the same manner. Under the common-law doctrine of incompatible public offices, however, the simultaneous holding of two incompatible public offices is generally prohibited.[2] Where an individual holding one public office subsequently accepts another office that is legally incompatible with the first, the acceptance of the second office may automatically terminate the first office. In such circumstances, no separate judicial order or formal removal proceeding is necessarily required, as the first office is regarded as having ended ipso facto that is, by the very act of accepting the incompatible second office.[3]
Public Office as a Public Trust
Public office is not the private property of its holder but a public trust exercised for the people’s benefit. Accordingly, the rights attached to office are subject to constitutional and statutory limits governing dual office-holding, incompatibility, removal, tenure, and remuneration. This reflects the maxim salus populi suprema lex “the welfare of the people is the supreme law.[4]
Temporary and Acting Designations
The temporary or acting nature of a public appointment does not necessarily remove constitutional restrictions on holding multiple offices. In Funa v. Agra, the Court affirmed that constitutional restrictions on dual office-holding extend to temporary and acting designations. Thus, an acting or temporary appointment cannot be used to circumvent constitutional limits on the simultaneous holding of public offices.[5]
Dual Office-Holding: A Constitutional Dilemma Facing Somalia
Somalia remains a fragile state, with continuing weaknesses in its legal and institutional frameworks. These challenges are particularly evident in the constitutional sphere, where the Presidency, House of the People, and Senate promulgated what has been referred to as the 2026 Constitution, whose legal validity and broader public acceptance remain contested.[6]
The present discussion, however, concerns less the Constitution’s validity than its enforceability and practical implementation. Article 190(1) provides that constitutional amendments approved by a two-thirds majority of both Houses shall be promulgated by the President and enter into force 30 days after publication in the Official Gazette. Although this process was completed in March 2026, concerns remain about consistent constitutional compliance, particularly where office-holders appear to depart from constitutional restrictions governing public office and tenure.
Recent developments illustrate this dilemma. The election of Abdulkadir Mohamed Nur as Speaker of the House of the People on 10 August 2026, following his service in an executive position, raises questions concerning the relinquishment and incompatibility of public offices. Similarly, the appointment of sitting Members of Parliament to executive positions, most recently Osman Mohamed Abdi as Deputy Minister of Commerce and Industry, raises the broader issue of simultaneously holding or exercising legislative and executive functions. These examples highlight the practical challenge of enforcing constitutional limits on dual office-holding and incompatible public offices.
Accordingly, where Article 81 establishes an incompatibility between parliamentary membership and another public office, administrative practice or political convenience cannot override the constitutional restriction. This reflects the maxim nemo dat quod non habet “no one can give what they do not possess” meaning that a public authority cannot confer a right to hold offices concurrently where the Constitution prohibits or limits such holding.
Conversely, political controversy alone does not establish unconstitutionality. Such a conclusion requires identifying the specific constitutional prohibition and applying it to the facts of the particular case.
Separation of Powers and Institutional Conflict
The constitutional concern is not merely personal but institutional. The legislature performs law-making, representation, and oversight functions, while the executive implements laws and administers government. When the same individual simultaneously exercises legislative and executive functions, the boundary between oversight and implementation may become blurred. The maxim quis custodiet ipsos custodes? “who will guard the guardians themselves?” captures this accountability concern.
The doctrine of incompatibility of public offices provides a useful framework for examining such situations. Under the classical approach reflected in cases such as People ex rel. Ryan v. Green, offices may be considered incompatible where their functions conflict, particularly when one office supervises, controls, or scrutinizes the other, thereby weakening institutional checks and balances.
In Somalia, the issue is illustrated by the presence of Members of Parliament and Senators serving concurrently within the Council of Ministers. Among them are First Deputy Prime Minister Salah Jama, who also serves as a Senator, and Deputy Prime Minister Jibriil Cabdirashiid Xaaji, who holds a seat in the House of the People, together with other ministers, deputy ministers, and state ministers who are members of the Federal Parliament. The Council of Ministers comprises approximately 75 office-holders, with 45 members identified within the relevant executive categories, comprising 18 senior executive officials, 16 ministers, 14 deputy ministers, and 13 state ministers. This overlap extends beyond individual appointments and raises a broader constitutional question concerning the compatibility of legislative membership with executive office and the effective separation of powers.
Conclusion
The constitutional validity of dual office-holding cannot be established merely by its repetition in governmental practice. The Constitution remains the supreme legal norm, and public offices must be exercised within its express requirements and limitations.
The maxim consuetudo contra constitutionem non valet custom contrary to the Constitution has no legal validity means that repeated administrative practice cannot create a constitutional exception or override an express constitutional limitation. Each instance of dual office-holding must therefore be assessed against the constitutional text, the nature and level of the offices concerned, and any applicable exceptions.
Where incompatibility exists, constitutional requirements must prevail; where genuine ambiguity exists, it should be resolved through authoritative constitutional interpretation. Ultimately, governmental practice must conform to the Constitution, not the Constitution to governmental practice.
For purposes of examining the constitutional implications of dual office-holding under Article 81, the identified cases may be classified into three categories: (1) the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Ministers, and Ministers who simultaneously hold another public office; (2) Deputy Ministers who simultaneously hold another public office; and (3) State Ministers who simultaneously hold another public office. This classification provides a basis for assessing the compatibility of these concurrent positions with constitutional requirements concerning office incompatibility, separation of powers, and the lawful exercise of public authority.
[1] National Conference of State Legislation, ‘Summary of Dual Office-Holding Restrictions’ (2021), published by NCSL available at https://www.ncsl.org/ethics/dual-office-holding-restrictions.
[2] Municipal Technical Advisory Service: institute for public service, ‘Dual Office Holding’ (2026), Published on MTAS – Serving Tennessee City Officials (https://www.mtas.tennessee.edu.) or https://www.mtas.tennessee.edu/node/143481/printable/pdf.
[3] See, the case law of The Tennessee Supreme Court in State v. Thompson, 246 S.W.2d 59 (Tenn. 1952),
[4] St. John’s Law Review, ‘Dual Office Holding and Conflicts in Appointive Powers’ (1957), Volume 31, No.2 https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4615&context=lawreview.
[5] G.R. No. 191644 (19 February 2013)
[6] Afyare Abdi Elmi, ‘Somalia needs a political settlement before it is too late’ (2026), Al-Jazeera Opinion, at https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2026/6/2/somalia-needs-a-political-settlement-before-it-is-too-late.
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